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Table 8 reports the results of four projections in the scenarios
previously described. The comparison between the first columns of tables 7
and 8 shows that the devolution enlarges the scale of interregional
redistribution of about 50% as the total amount of equalising transfers grows
from 10 to 16 billions of Euro. As described by table 9, the increment is due
entirely to the component that equalises fiscal capacity: the enlargement of
the VAT sharing emphasises the effect of the uneven distribution of
consumption among Regions. Quite interestingly the introduction of a new
correction for education need in the equalisation formula reduces the
interregional transfers.
As shown by table 9 the corrections for health and education need
are negatively correlated. This is easily explained as the older the population
is, the higher the health need and the lower the education need are.
Overall, the devolution strengthens the polarisation of financial
flows between the Northern Regions, which have high consumption and low
education need, and the Southern Regions, where consumption is low but
the education need is high due to a relatively young population.
As to the effects of higher economic growth in the South, the
devolution does not change significantly the results: the total amount of
transfers is reduced by about one fifth.
6 – Concluding Remarks
Since the Seventies, local governments in Italy were financially
dependent on grants from the central government. The lack of fiscal
autonomy was the source of several inefficiencies and the main reason of
large budget deficits at the local level. During the ‘90s the fiscal autonomy
of local governments has been substantially increased: local governments
now have the power to raise own taxes and receive a large share of revenue
from national taxes. A new system of equalising grants has been
implemented to support regions with small tax bases.
This fundamental reform has removed many deficiencies of the past
system of local public finance. Yet, there are many issues that must be dealt
with in the future. First, the principle of uniformity in health standards
across the country, might be at odds with the decision of eliminating any
kind of ex-post financing in order to foster the financial responsibility of
local government. Second, the incentives to implement autonomous tax
policies at the local level might be hindered by the new mechanism of
interregional redistribution. Finally, the viability of the entire system in the
medium-long run is conditional on the evolution of the North-South
dualism.
